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Abstract
State-of-the-art neural networks are vulnerable to
adversarial examples; they can easily misclassify
inputs that are imperceptibly different than their
training and test data. In this work, we establish
that the use of cross-entropy loss function and the
low-rank features of the training data have respon-
sibility for the existence of these inputs. Based on
this observation, we suggest that addressing ad-
versarial examples requires rethinking the use of
cross-entropy loss function and looking for an al-
ternative that is more suited for minimization with
low-rank features. In this direction, we present a
training scheme called differential training, which
uses a loss function defined on the differences be-
tween the features of points from opposite classes.
We show that differential training can ensure a
large margin between the decision boundary of
the neural network and the points in the training
dataset. This larger margin increases the amount
of perturbation needed to flip the prediction of
the classifier and makes it harder to find an adver-
sarial example with small perturbations. We test
differential training on a binary classification task
with CIFAR-10 dataset and demonstrate that it
radically reduces the ratio of images for which an
adversarial example could be found – not only in
the training dataset, but in the test dataset as well.
1. Introduction
Despite their high accuracy on training and test datasets,
state-of-the-art neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial
examples: they can easily misclassify inputs that are indis-
tinguishable from the training and test data and express very
high confidence for their wrong predictions (Szegedy et al.,
2013). Several methods have recently been introduced to
generate these adversarial inputs (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Authors are with Department of Electrical Engineering and Com-
puter Sciences, University of California, Berkeley.
Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017;
Athalye et al., 2018); and simplicity and effectiveness of
these methods have reinforced the concerns about the use
of neural networks in many tasks.
The presence of adversarial examples was initially attributed
to the high nonlinearity of deep neural networks (Szegedy
et al., 2013). Later, however, it was shown that a network
with few layers and a high dimensional input space could
also suffer from this problem (Goodfellow et al., 2015).
Support vector machines with radial basis function, on the
other hand, were robust to these malicious inputs: their
accuracy on test datasets and adversarial examples were
comparable. Based on these observations, it was claimed
that neural networks, unlike support vector machines, failed
to introduce adequate nonlinearity as a feature mapping,
and this was suggested to be the main explanation for the
existence of adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015).
It is correct that neural networks and support vector ma-
chines differ in their level of nonlinearity and their level
of robustness against adversarial examples, but this fact on
its own does not suffice to build a causal relation between
the adversarial examples and the nonlinearity of the classi-
fier. There are many other aspects that neural networks and
support vector machines differ in and any of these factors
may also have responsibility for the presence of adversarial
examples. A major one of these factors is the training pro-
cedure.
Training a support vector machine involves solving a con-
vex optimization problem defined with the hinge loss func-
tion (Hastie et al., 2009). Due to convexity of the problem,
the choice of optimization algorithm has no influence on the
classifier obtained at the end of training. In contrast, training
a neural network requires solving a nonconvex problem, and
the dynamics of the optimization algorithm becomes critical
for the solution. It determines the local optimum obtained,
and hence, the decision boundary of the trained network.
The existence of adversarial examples is the manifestation
of a poor margin between the decision boundary of the net-
work and the points in the training and test datasets (Fawzi
et al., 2017). What is interesting is the closeness of the
training points to the decision boundary: for some reason,
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the decision boundary resides extremely close to the train-
ing points even after the training is complete – although
the main purpose of training is to find a boundary that is
reasonably far away from these points. We seek out a reason
for this poor margin among the ingredients of neural net-
work training that are widely taken for granted: the gradient
methods and the cross-entropy loss function.
1.1. Our contributions
1. We show that if a linear classifier is trained by mini-
mizing the cross-entropy loss function via the gradient
descent algorithm, and if the features of the training
points lie on a low-dimensional affine subspace, then
the margin between the decision boundary of the classi-
fier and the training points could become much smaller
than the optimal value.
2. We show that the penultimate layer of neural networks
are very likely to produce low-rank features, and we
provide empirical evidence for this on a binary classifi-
cation task with CIFAR-10 dataset. Combined with the
first contribution, this suggests that neural networks
could have a poor margin in their penultimate layer,
and consequently, very small perturbations in this layer
can easily flip the decision of the classifier.
3. In order to improve the margin, we put forward a train-
ing scheme called differential training, which uses a
loss function defined on the differences between the
features of the points from opposite classes. We show
that this training scheme allows finding the solution
with the largest hard margin for linear classifiers while
still using the gradient descent algorithm.
4. We introduce a loss function that improves the margin
for nonlinear classifiers and display its effectiveness on
a synthetic problem. Then we test this loss function on
a binary classification task with CIFAR-10 dataset, and
show that it prevents the Projected Gradient Descent
Attack (Madry et al., 2018; Kurakin et al., 2016) from
being able to find an adversarial example for most of
the training and test data.
5. On CIFAR-10 dataset, we empirically show that the
network produced by differential training generalizes
well over the adversarial examples. That is, the accu-
racy of the network is virtually the same on adversarial
examples generated from the training dataset and on
those generated from the test dataset. This result is
critical given that the networks trained with robust op-
timization were shown not to generalize on adversarial
examples (Schmidt et al., 2018).
1.2. Related Works
The minimization of cross-entropy loss function via the
gradient descent algorithm has recently been studied for
linear classifiers, and its solution has been shown to be
equivalent to a support vector machine (Soudry et al., 2018).
However, it has not been emphasized that the separating
hyperplane produced by the cross-entropy minimization
is constrained to pass through the origin in an augmented
space. We show that this fact could cause the margin of
the classifier to be drastically small if the features of the
dataset lie in a low-dimensional affine subspace in a high
dimensional feature space. We also show that this case is not
atypical when a neural network is trained with the gradient
descent algorithm, and we build a connection between this
fact and the existence of adversarial examples.
It is known that if a support vector machine is formulated
to find a separating hyperplane passing through the origin,
the decision boundary of the classifier will be smaller than
the optimal value. In order to overcome this problem and
to speed up online learning algorithms for support vector
machines, the idea of using the differences between the
points from opposite classes has previously been suggested
in (Ishibashi et al., 2008; Keerthi et al., 1999). We show
that a similar idea in differential training also improves the
margin when a neural network is being trained with a
gradient-based method.
Differential training uses the differences between the fea-
tures of the training points from opposite classes. This
training scheme has been intentionally introduced to im-
prove the dynamics of the gradient descent algorithm on the
training cost function; and we consider it as using an alter-
native cost function in the sequel since the choice of cost
function is very critical. However, the procedure could also
be considered as using an identical pair of networks in the
network architecture, which is closely related to the Siamese
Networks (Bromley et al., 1993; Chopra et al., 2005). These
networks were previously shown to perform well if limited
data were available from any of the classes in a classifi-
cation task (Koch et al., 2015). Our work shows that this
architecture can also provide a large margin between the
decision boundary of the classifier and the training points,
and consequently, be more robust to adversarial examples if
the network is trained with the cost function we suggest in
Section 4.2.
2. Cross-Entropy Loss on Low-Rank Features
Leads to Poor Margins
Cross-entropy loss function is almost the sole choice for
classification tasks in practice. Its prevalent use is backed
theoretically by its association with the minimization of the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between the empirical distribu-
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Decision boundary 
obtained with
cross-entropy minimization
Figure 1. Orange and blue points lie on a low-dimensional affine
subspace in R2, and they represent the data from two different
classes. Cross-entropy minimization for a linear classifier on these
points leads to the decision boundary shown with the solid line,
which attains an extremely poor margin.
tion of a dataset and the confidence of the classifier for that
dataset. Given the particular success of neural networks for
classification tasks (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Simonyan &
Zisserman, 2014; He et al., 2016), there seems to be little
motivation to search for alternatives for this loss function,
and most of the software developed for neural networks
incorporates an efficient implementation for it, thereby fa-
cilitating its further use.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a typical case where the use
of cross-entropy loss function can create a problem for the
classifier, as shown in Figure 1. The source of this problem
is pointed out in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Assume that the points {xi}i∈I and {yj}j∈J
are linearly separable and lie in an affine subspace; that is,
there exist a set of orthonormal vectors {rk}k∈K and a set
of scalars {∆k}k∈K such that
〈rk, xi〉 = 〈rk, yj〉 = ∆k ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀k ∈ K.
Let 〈w, ·〉+B = 0 denote the decision boundary obtained
by minimizing the cross-entropy loss function
−
∑
i∈I
log
(
ew
>xi+b
1 + ew>xi+b
)
−
∑
j∈J
log
(
1
1 + ew
>yj+b
)
,
and assume that w and B are scaled such that
min
i∈I,j∈J
〈w, xi〉 − 〈w, yj〉 = 2.
Then the minimization of the cross-entropy loss yields a
margin smaller than or equal to
1√
1
γ2 +B
2
∑
k∈K ∆
2
k
where γ denotes the optimal hard margin given by the SVM
solution.
Remark 1. Theorem 1 shows that if the training points
lie on an affine subspace, and if the cross-entropy loss is
minimized with the gradient descent algorithm, then the
margin of the classifier will be smaller than the optimal
margin value. As the dimension of this affine subspace
decreases, the cardinality of the setK increases and the term∑
k∈K ∆
2
k could become much larger than 1/γ
2. Therefore,
as the dimension of the subspace containing the training
points gets smaller compared to the dimension of the input
space, cross-entropy minimization with a gradient method
becomes more likely to yield a poor margin.
The next corollary relaxes the condition of Theorem 1 and
allows the training points to be near an affine subspace
instead of being exactly on it.
Corollary 1. Assume that the points {xi}i∈I and {yj}j∈J
in Rd are linearly separable and there exist a set of or-
thonormal vectors {rk}k∈K and a set of scalars {∆k}k∈K
such that
〈rk, xi〉 ≥ ∆k, 〈rk, yj〉 ≤ ∆k ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀k ∈ K.
Let 〈w, ·〉+B = 0 denote the decision boundary obtained
by minimizing the cross-entropy loss, as in Theorem 1. Then
the minimization of the cross-entropy loss yields a margin
smaller than or equal to
1√
B2
∑
k∈K ∆
2
k
Note that the ability to compare the margin obtained by
cross-entropy minimization with the optimal value is lost.
Nevertheless, it highlights the fact that same set of points
could be assigned a substantially different margin by cross-
entropy minimization if all of them are shifted away from
the origin by the same amount in the same direction.
3. Penultimate Layers of Neural Networks
Contain Low-Rank Features
The results in the previous section were for linear classifiers,
and correspondingly, the features of the training points were
the points themselves. In this section, we consider neural
networks and regard the outputs of their penultimate layer
as the features of the training points. Following theorem
shows that these features can have a very low rank if the
network is trained with a gradient method.
Proposition 1. Given a set of points {xi}i∈I , assume that
an L-layer network is trained by minimizing the cross-
entropy loss function:
min
w,θ
∑
i∈I − log
(
ew
>φθ(xi)
1 + ew>φθ(xi)
)
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where φθ(xi) is the output of the penultimate layer of the
network and represents the features for point xi. Assume
that φθ ends with a linear layer, i.e.,
φθ(·) = W · hθ(·)
where W is a matrix and hθ(·) is the first L − 2 layers of
the network. If the gradient descent algorithm is initialized
with W [0] = 0, then the rank of the set {φθˆ(xi)}i∈I is at
most 1 whenever the algorithm is terminated.
The assumption on the initialization of the matrix W could
be removed if the network has a certain structure – for
example, if the last layer of hθ(·) ends with a squishing
function such as arctan or tanh. In this case, the points
in {φθ(xi)}i∈I keep growing in the same direction if the
algorithm is run for long enough, and consequently, this set
converges to a set with rank 1 as well. More detail on this
case is provided in Appendix B.
Note that the only strong assumption in Proposition 1 is
the requirement that φθ ends with a linear layer. Otherwise,
φθ is allowed to contain any type of nonlinear activation
functions and convolutional layers.
To empirically verify whether the features in a neural net-
work are still low-rank even when the penultimate layer is
nonlinear, we trained a standard network with ReLU activa-
tions for a binary classification task on CIFAR-10 dataset.
The cross-entropy loss function was minimized with three
different optimization schemes to train the network. Even
though all parameters of the network were initialized as
in (He et al., 2015), the features in the penultimate layer had
rank 2 if the training cost was minimized via the gradient
method with momentum. When the optimization algorithm
was changed to Adam or when batch normalization was
used during training, the rank of the features still remained
much lower than the dimension of the feature space, as
shown in Figure 2.
Remark 2. Proposition 1, along with the empirical obser-
vations on CIFAR-10 dataset, shows that the low-rankness
of the features of the training dataset is not an exceptional
case; on the contrary, it can arise in most cases. This is
recently supported by (Martin & Mahoney, 2018) as well.
Along with the main result of Section 2, the fact that penul-
timate layer of the network contains low-rank features in-
dicates a small margin between the decision boundary of
the classifier and the features in this layer. In other words,
small perturbations in the penultimate layer can easily flip
the decision of the classifier.
4. Differential Training Improves Margin
In previous sections, we saw that the combination of cross-
entropy loss function, low-rank features of training dataset,
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Figure 2. The outputs of the penultimate layer of a neural network
can be considered as the features of the training points. A four-
layer convolutional network is trained by minimizing the cross-
entropy loss function via three different optimization schemes. The
plot shows the cumulative variance explained for these features
as a function of the number of principle components used. The
features lie in a two-dimensional subspace if the gradient method
with momentum is used. For the other two algorithms, almost all
the variance in the features is captured by the first 20 principle
components out of 84.
and gradient descent algorithm could lead to a poor mar-
gin. We change the training cost function in the following
subsections in order to increase the margin of the classifier.
4.1. Differential Training for Linear Classifiers
Consider the binary classification problem with only two
training points, x and y, from two different classes. If we
use cross-entropy loss function to find a linear classifier by
minimizing
− log
(
ew
>x+b
1 + ew>x+b
)
− log
(
1
1 + ew>y+b
)
,
the gradient descent algorithm gives the update rule:
w ← w + η
(
x
e−w
>x−b
1 + e−w>x−b
− y e
w>y+b
1 + ew>y+b
)
(1)
where η is the learning rate of the algorithm. The update
rule for w reveals a critical fact: even though the optimal
direction for w is x− y, the increments in w are usually not
in this direction.
Now consider the problem of finding a separating hyper-
plane for a linearly separable dataset. If the dataset is low
rank, the differences between the training points span a low-
dimensional subspace. However, at each iteration of the
gradient descent algorithm, the increments on the normal
vector of the decision boundary will usually contain compo-
nents outside of this subspace, as can be seen in (1). These
increments could be forced to lie in the same subspace by
feeding the differences of the points from opposite classes –
instead of the points themselves – into the loss function. In
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fact, a loss function of this form enables finding the sepa-
rating hyperplane with the largest margin with the gradient
descent algorithm.
Theorem 2. Given two sets of points {xi}i∈I and {yj}j∈J
that are linearly separable in Rd, if we solve
min
w∈Rd
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J log(1 + e
−w>(xi−yj)) (2)
by using the gradient descent algorithm with a sufficiently
small learning rate, then the direction of w converges to the
direction of the maximum-margin solution, i.e.
lim
t→∞
w(t)
‖w(t)‖ =
wSVM
‖wSVM‖ , (3)
wherewSVM is the solution to the hard-margin SVM problem.
Minimization of the cost function (2) provides only the
weight parameter wˆ of the decision boundary. The bias
parameter, b, could be chosen by plotting the histogram
of the inner products {〈wˆ, xi〉}i∈I and {〈wˆ, yj〉}j∈J and
fixing a value for bˆ such that
〈wˆ, xi〉+ bˆ ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, (4a)
〈wˆ, yj〉+ bˆ ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ J. (4b)
The largest hard margin is achieved by
bˆ = −1
2
min
i∈I
〈wˆ, xi〉 − 1
2
max
j∈J
〈wˆ, yj〉. (5)
However, by choosing a larger or smaller value for bˆ, it is
possible to make a tradeoff between the Type-I and Type-II
errors.
The cost function (2) includes a loss defined on every pair
of data points from the two classes. There are two aspects
of this fact:
1. When standard loss functions are used for classification
tasks, we need to oversample or undersample either
of the classes if the training dataset contains different
number of points from different classes. This problem
does not arise when we use the cost function (2).
2. The number of pairs, |I| × |J |, will usually be much
larger than the size of the original dataset, which con-
tains |I|+ |J | points. Therefore, the minimization of
(2) might appear more expensive than the minimiza-
tion of the standard cross-entropy loss computationally.
However, if the points in different classes are well sep-
arated and the stochastic gradient method is used to
minimize (2), the algorithm could achieve zero training
error after using only a few pairs, which is formalized
in Theorem 3. Further computation is needed only to
improve the margin of the classifier. In addition, in our
experiments to train a neural network to classify two
classes from the CIFAR-10 dataset, only a few percent
of |I|×|J | pairs were observed to be sufficient to reach
an accuracy on the test dataset that is comparable to
the accuracy of the cross-entropy loss minimization.
Theorem 3. Given two sets of points {xi}i∈I and {yj}j∈J
that are linearly separable in Rd, assume the cost function
(2) is minimized with the stochastic gradient method. Define
Rx = max{‖xi − xi′‖ : i, i′ ∈ I},
Ry = max{‖yj − yj′‖ : j, j′ ∈ J},
and let γ denote the hard margin that would be obtained
with the SVM:
2γ = maxu∈Rd mini∈I,j∈J 〈xi − yj , u/‖u‖〉.
If 2γ ≥ 5 max(Rx, Ry), then the stochastic gradient algo-
rithm produces a weight parameter, wˆ, only in one iteration
which satisfies the inequalities (4a)-(4b) along with the bias,
bˆ, given by (5).
4.2. Differential Training for Nonlinear Classifiers
When a neural network is used to find a nonlinear classifier,
a candidate cost function analogous to (2) for differential
training would be∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J log
(
1 + e−w
>(φθ(xi)−φθ(yj))
)
(6)
where φθ(·) is the output of the penultimate layer of the
network and represents the features of the points. However,
minimization of (6) has been observed to fail in provid-
ing a large margin in the input space in our experiments.
One reason for this is that the minimization of (6) does not
guarantee a small Lipschitz constant for the mapping φθ.
Therefore, even if the margin is large in the penultimate
layer, the margin in the input space could still be very small.
A cost function that does provide a large margin in the
input space is∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
(
w>φθ(xi)− w>φθ(yj)− 1
)2
. (7)
A partial explanation for the different behavior of this func-
tion is that the gradient descent algorithm is more likely
to converge to a solution with small Lipschitz constant if
the network is trained with the squared error loss (Nar &
Sastry, 2018). Consequently, the gradient method is more
likely to produce a φθ which has a small Lipschitz constant,
and this implies that the input of φθ needs to change by
a large amount in order for its output to move across the
decision boundary.
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Figure 3. A two-layer neural network is trained with two different
cost functions. Cross-entropy minimization marks the region be-
tween the dotted lines as the class of blue points, whereas the same
class is assigned to the region inside the solid curve when differ-
ential training is used. Note that the decision boundaries obtained
with cross-entropy minimization have extremely small margins.
The effect of training with the cost function (7) on the mar-
gin of a nonlinear classifier is demonstrated in Figure 3. A
neural network with one hidden layer was trained with two
different training cost functions: cross-entropy loss and the
differential training cost (7). The minimization of cross-
entropy loss provided an extremely poor margin in the input
space, whereas the use of (7) lead to a decision boundary
with large margins.
5. Experiment on CIFAR-10: Differential
Training Removes Adversarial Examples
A large margin between the decision boundary of the clas-
sifier and the points in the training dataset is expected to
make it harder to find adversarial examples for these points.
In order to verify if this is the case, we trained a four-layer
convolutional neural network for a binary classification task
on CIFAR-10 dataset by only using the images for planes
and horses. Both cross-entropy minimization and differen-
tial training achieved zero error on the training dataset, and
the accuracies of both training schemes were comparable on
the test dataset: cross-entropy minimization lead to 93.65%
while differential training yielded 94.65%.
We generated adversarial examples for the images in the
training dataset using Projected Gradient Descent Attack
(PGD) implemented by (Rauber et al., 2017). The robust-
ness of the neural network against these adversarial ex-
amples was substantially different based on whether the
network was trained with the cross-entropy loss or the dif-
ferential training cost (7).
As shown in Figure 4, PGD was able to find adversarial
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Figure 4. A four-layer convolutional neural network is trained for
a binary classification task on CIFAR-10 dataset with two differ-
ent training schemes: cross-entropy minimization and differential
training. If the network is trained with differential training, the ac-
curacy of the network is much higher for the adversarial examples
generated from the training and test datasets with the PGD Attack.
Moreover, the accuracy of the network on the adversarial examples
generated from the training dataset is almost the same as its accu-
racy on those generated from the test dataset. Solid lines denote
the accuracy on adversarial examples generated from the train-
ing dataset, and dashed lines denote the accuracy on adversarial
examples generated from the test dataset.
examples for the images in the training dataset with small
perturbations if the network was trained with the cross-
entropy loss. In contrast, if the network was trained with
differential training, PGD failed to find adversarial examples
for the training dataset without disturbing the images by a
large amount. Please note that PGD was considered to be the
most powerful first-order gradient-based attack in (Madry
et al., 2018).
Somewhat surprisingly, the same behavior was observed
on the test dataset as well. As displayed in Figure 4, PGD
failed to find adversarial examples for most of the images
in the test dataset when the network was trained via dif-
ferential training. Moreover, the accuracy of the network
was almost the same for adversarial examples generated
from the training dataset and for those generated from the
test dataset.
We also tested the network under the Carlini-Wagner At-
tack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) implemented by (Rauber
et al., 2017). Similar to its performance under PGD Attack,
the accuracy of the network trained with differential training
remained much higher compared to the network trained with
cross-entropy minimization, as shown in Figure 5.
6. Discussion
Low-dimensionality of the training dataset. As stated in
Remark 1, as the dimension of the affine subspace contain-
ing the training dataset gets very small compared to the
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Figure 5. A four-layer convolutional network is trained with two
different schemes: cross-entropy minimization and differential
training. If the network is trained with differential training, the
accuracy of the network is much higher on the adversarial examples
generated from the test dataset with the Carlini-Wagner Attack.
dimension of the input space, the training algorithm will
become more likely to yield a small margin for the classifier.
This observation confirms the results of (Marzi et al., 2018),
which showed that if the training dataset is projected onto
a low-dimensional subspace before being fed into a neural
network, the performance of the network against adversarial
examples is improved – since projecting the inputs onto
a low-dimensional domain corresponds to decreasing the
dimension of the input space. Even though this method is
effective, it requires the knowledge of the domain in which
the training points are low-dimensional. Because this knowl-
edge will not always be available a priori, finding alternative
training algorithms and loss functions that are suited for low-
dimensional data is still an important direction for future
research.
Robust optimization. Using robust optimization to train
neural networks has been shown to be effective against ad-
versarial examples (Madry et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018).
Note that these techniques could be considered as inflating
the training points by a presumed amount and training the
classifier with these inflated points. Nevertheless, as long
as the cross-entropy loss is involved, the decision bound-
aries of the neural network will still be in the vicinity of
the inflated points. Therefore, even though the classifier is
robust against the disturbances of the presumed magnitude,
the margin of the classifier could still be much smaller than
what it could potentially be.
Differential training. We introduced differential training,
which allows the feature mapping to remain trainable while
ensuring a large margin between different classes of points.
By doing so, this method combines the benefits of neural net-
works with those of support vector machines. Even though
moving from 2N training points to N2 pairs might seem
prohibitive, it points out that a true classification should in
fact be able to differentiate between the pairs that are hardest
to differentiate, and this search will necessarily require an
N2 term. Some heuristic methods are likely to be effective,
such as considering only a smaller subset of points closer
to the boundary and updating this set of points as needed
during training. If a neural network is trained with this pro-
cedure, the network will be forced to find features that are
able to tell apart between the hardest pairs.
Generalization of differential training, and its connec-
tion to one-shot learning. It has been shown that if a neural
network is trained with robust optimization, the accuracy
of the network on adversarial examples generated from the
test dataset could be very low – even though the accuracy
on adversarial examples produced from the training dataset
is high (Schmidt et al., 2018). Consequently, it has been
claimed that the robust optimization requires large amount
of data so as to make a network robust against adversarial
perturbations on the unseen images. Our empirical results
on CIFAR-10 dataset suggest that differential training does
not suffer from this problem. That is, differential training
provides neural networks with robustness while still using
fewer data. This is in congruence with the main premise
of (Koch et al., 2015), which showed that Siamese networks
with an identical pair of networks in their architecture per-
form well with few training points. Please see Section 1.2
for further comments on the relation between differential
training and Siamese networks.
Why not empirical risk minimization with a well-known
loss function? Consider the standard problem of empirical
risk minimization as the proxy for finding a classifier:
min
w,θ
∑
i∈I ` (w, φθ(xi); zi) (8)
where zi denotes the label of the point xi, and (w, θ) are the
parameters of the classifier. If the features of the training
points {φθ(xi)}i∈I lie in a low-dimensional subspace, the
cost function (8) will likely not be strictly convex; and more
importantly, there will be directions in which the parameters
are not penalized. Normally, the remedy would be to intro-
duce a regularization term into the cost function. However,
the effectiveness of well-known regularization terms is dubi-
ous for neural networks: they do not prevent spectral norms
of weight matrices from growing unboundedly (Bartlett
et al., 2017), nor do they influence the generalization gap of
networks noticeably (Zhang et al., 2017). Therefore, even
if a regularization term is added externally, the gradient
descent algorithm will have the potential to drive the param-
eters in the directions that are not penalized and cause the
decision boundary to reside in the vicinity of the training
points. Note that the loss function `(·) need not be the cross-
entropy loss for this to happen. This is why the problem of
poor margins is in fact not peculiar to the cross-entropy loss,
and this is why other well-known loss functions will likely
also fail in addressing adversarial examples.
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A. Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
Lemma 1 (Adapted from Theorem 3 of (Soudry et al.,
2018)). Given two sets of points {xi}i∈I and {yj}j∈J that
are linearly separable in Rd, let x˜i and y˜j denote [x>i 1]>
and [y>j 1]
>, respectively, for all i ∈ I , j ∈ J . Then
the iterate of the gradient descent algorithm, w˜(t), on the
cross-entropy loss function
min
w˜∈Rd+1
∑
i∈I log(1 + e
−w˜>x˜i) +
∑
j∈J log(1 + e
w˜>y˜j )
with a sufficiently small step size will converge in direction:
lim
t→∞
w˜(t)
‖w˜(t)‖ =
w
‖w‖ ,
where w is the solution to
minimize
z∈Rd+1
‖z‖2 (9)
subject to 〈z, x˜i〉 ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ I,
〈z, y˜j〉 ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that w = u +
∑m
k=1 αkrk,
where u ∈ Rd and 〈u, rk〉 = 0 for all k ∈ K. By denoting
z = [w> b]>, the Lagrangian of the problem (9) can be
written as
1
2
‖w‖2 + 1
2
b2 +
∑
i∈I µi(1− 〈w, xi〉 − b)
+
∑
j∈J νj(−1 + 〈w, yj〉+ b),
where µi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I and νj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J . KKT
conditions for the optimality of w and B requires that
w =
∑
i∈I
µixi −
∑
j∈J
νjyj , B =
∑
i∈I
µi −
∑
j∈J
νj ,
and consequently, for each k ∈ K,
〈w, rk〉 =
∑
i∈I µi〈xi, rk〉 −
∑
j∈J νj〈yj , rk〉
=
∑
i∈I ∆kµi −
∑
j∈J ∆kνj = B∆k.
Then, we can write w as
w = u+
∑
k∈K B∆krk.
Let 〈wSVM, ·〉+ bSVM = 0 denote the hyperplane obtained
as the solution of SVM. Then wSVM solves
minimize
w
‖w‖2 (10)
subject to 〈w, xi − yj〉 ≥ 2 ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J.
Since the vector u also satisfies 〈u, xi − yj〉 = 〈w, xi −
yj〉 ≥ 2 for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J , we have ‖u‖ ≥ ‖wSVM‖ = 1γ .
As a result, the margin obtained by minimizing the cross-
entropy loss is
1
‖w‖ =
1√‖u‖2 +∑ ‖B∆krk‖2 ≤ 1√ 1
γ2 +B
2
∑
∆2k
.

Proof of Corollary 1. If B < 0, we could consider the
hyperplane 〈w, ·〉 − B = 0 for the points {−xi}i∈I and
{−yj}j∈J , which would have the identical margin due to
symmetry. Therefore, without loss of generality, assume
B ≥ 0. As in the proof of Theorem 1, KKT conditions for
the optimality of w and B requires
w =
∑
i∈I
µixi −
∑
j∈J
νjyj , B =
∑
i∈I
µi −
∑
j∈J
νj
where µi ≥ 0 and νj ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J . Note that for
each k ∈ K,
〈w, rk〉 =
∑
i∈I µi〈xi, rk〉 −
∑
j∈J νj〈yj , rk〉
= B∆k +
∑
i∈I µi(〈xi, rk〉 −∆k)
−
∑
j∈J νj(〈−yj , rk〉 −∆k) ≥ B∆k.
Since {rk}k∈K is an orthonormal set of vectors,
‖w‖2 ≥
∑
k∈K 〈w, rk〉
2 ≥
∑
k∈K B
2∆2k.
The result follows from the fact that ‖w‖−1 is an upper
bound on the margin. 
B. Proposition 1 and Nonzero Initialization
Gradient descent algorithm on∑
i∈I log(1 + e
−w>Whθ(xi))
leads to the dynamics
W˙ = wv>, w˙ = Wv, (11)
where
v =
∑
i∈I hθ(xi)
e−w
>Whθ(xi)
1 + e−w>Whθ(xi)
.
If W (0) = 0, then w preserves its direction and w(t) =
w(0)α(t) for all t ≥ 0, where α(·) : [0,∞) → R. Con-
sequently, the column space of W (t) is spanned by only
w(0), and W (t) has rank 1 or 0 for every t ≥ 0. This
completes the proof of Proposition 1. In order to make
a statement without the condition on W (0), we need the
following lemma.
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Lemma 2. Consider the n× n matrix[
0 v
v> 0
]
where v ∈ Rn−1 and assume n ≥ 2. It has only one positive
eigenvalue, ‖v‖2, with the eigenvector [v> ‖v‖2]>.
Proof. The matrix is at most rank 2, so it has at most 2
nonzero eigenvalues. The vectors [v> ‖v‖2]> and [v> −
‖v‖2]> are its eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues
‖v‖2 and −‖v‖2, respectively. 
In the dynamics (11), if we consider v(t) as an exogenous
signal, the system described becomes a linear time-varying
system of the states (W,w). Moreover, the dynamics of
each row of the pair (W,w) is independent of the other
rows, but is governed by the same matrix. For example, the
kth row of the pair (W,w) satisfies:
W˙k1
...
W˙kn
w˙k
 =
[
0 v(t)
v(t)> 0
]
Wk1
...
Wkn
wk
 . (12)
If the last layer of hθ ends with a squishing function such
as arctan or tanh, and if all training points are classified
correctly during training, the dynamics of v becomes
v˙ ' −
∑
i∈I
hθ(xi)e
−w>Whθ(xi)(v>W>W+‖w‖2v>)hθ(xi)
if the network is trained for long enough. Then the change
in v becomes exponentially slower than those in W and w
as the training continues. Consequently, the vector v(t) in
(12) acts as a constant vector; and from Lemma 2, each row
of the matrix W grows in the direction v(t) by the same
ratio. As a result, if the algorithm is run for long, all rows
of W converge to the same direction. Correspondingly, all
of its columns converge to a set with rank 1 (or 0).
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Apply Lemma 1 by replacing the sets {xi}i∈I and {yj}j∈J
with {xi−yj}i∈I,j∈J and the empty set, respectively. Then
the minimization of the loss function (2) with the gradient
descent algorithm leads to
lim
t→∞
w
‖w‖ =
w
‖w‖
where w satisfies
w = arg min
w
‖w‖2 s.t. 〈w, xi − yj〉 ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J.
Since wSVM is the solution of (10), we obtain w = 12wSVM,
and the claim of the theorem holds. 
D. Proof of Theorem 3
In order to achieve zero training error in one iteration of the
stochastic gradient algorithm, it is sufficient to have
min
i′∈I
〈xi′ , xi − yj〉 > max
j′∈J
〈yj′ , xi − yj〉 ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J,
or equivalently,
〈xi′ − yj′ , xi − yj〉 > 0 ∀i, i′ ∈ I, ∀j, j′ ∈ J. (13)
By definition of the margin, there exists a vectorwSVM ∈ Rd
with unit norm which satisfies
2γ = mini∈I,j∈J〈xi − yj , wSVM〉.
Note thatwSVM is orthogonal to the decision boundary given
by the SVM. Then we can write every xi − yj as
xi − yj = 2γwSVM + δxi + δyj ,
where δxi , δ
y
j ∈ Rd and ‖δxi ‖ ≤ Rx and ‖δyj ‖ ≤ Ry. Then,
condition (13) is satisfied if
〈2γwSVM + δxi + δyj , 2γwSVM + δxi′ + δyj′〉 > 0
for all i, i′ ∈ I and for all j, j′ ∈ J ; or equivalently if
4γ2+2γ〈wSVM, δxi +δyj +δxi′+δyj′〉+〈δxi +δyj , δxi′+δyj′〉 > 0
(14)
for all i, i′ ∈ I and for all j, j′ ∈ J . If we choose γ >
5
2 max(Rx, Ry), we have
4γ2 − 2γ(2Rx + 2Ry)− (Rx +Ry)2 > 0,
which guarantees (14) and completes the proof. 
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